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7 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: COP
SADO
DS-II
DS-I
FA-III

SUBJECT: BGFIEND

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

- REFERENCES:
- a. British Telegram 243/244 of February 3,
from London to [] , copy attached.
 - b. FB-I Memorandum "BGFIEND - Implementation
of Clandestine Sea-borne Propaganda
Broadcasts", dated February 7, copy attached.
 - c. British Telegram 239/240 of February 3,
from London to [] , copy attached.

1. Recent developments in Project BGFIEND require that we make certain policy decisions with respect to the future conduct of this operation in the very near future. The current status of FIEND is as follows:

- a. We have in existence a Committee which is becoming increasingly restive over inactivity. They have formed a propaganda sub-committee which may prove to be very useful. Certain members of the Committee will be proceeding in the near future to the U.S. in order to establish Committee Headquarters in New York.
- b. We have made arrangements with the authorities in the U.S. Zone of Germany for facilities to hold Albanian recruits whom we shall wish to utilize for operational purposes. Training is to be accomplished clandestinely in the U.S. Zone of Germany under the administrative direction of our German Station.
- c. With the exception of a vessel, we have acquired the necessary equipment for a propaganda broadcast ship and had not negotiations on this subject with the British we should have been in a position to begin operation by this time.

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2. Reference a. conveys to [] BROADWAY's understanding of the Foreign Office revision of its view on our basic paper of December 6, 1949 as reported to us by [] in LOND-5870 (IN-14874). We are informed by [] that the British Embassy will shortly convey this information to the Department of State. It would appear from reference a. that we will have a suitable basis for joint operations with the British. This conclusion is reinforced by [] recent offer, subject to the approval of the Air C-in-C concerned, of an airfield at Zeltweg in the British Zone of Austria for use in infiltration operations, as well as by his recent official statement that the British will be willing to bear the cost of six air drops of leaflets per annum. Of especial interest in reference a., however, is that "cooperation of friendly Secret Services is permitted by the Foreign Office. Our view is that we should not repeat not deny ourselves advantage of assistance they can give us."

3. Reference b., as prepared by this office, sets forth the present status of the broadcast ship operation and examines the possibilities open to us to implement our plans in this connection. The conclusion is reached that we should make a unilateral approach to the French to enlist their cooperation in this isolated phase of BGFIEND. In the event that the British do not wish to associate themselves with us in such an approach they can scarcely, in view of the quotation from Reference a. contained in Paragraph 2, above, raise serious objections to a unilateral approach on our part.

4. Reference c. is a proposal by the British to inform the Italian Director of Naval Intelligence, as well as Field Marshal Papagos, along certain specified lines of the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation. Our discussions with OSO to date on the question of approaches to the Greek and/or Italian Services, particularly on the subject of BGFIEND as a joint Anglo-American operation, indicate that we will encounter considerable difficulty in obtaining OSO's agreement to such an approach. I would suggest, therefore, that our policy on this matter should be subject to referral of this question to the Department of State, which has indicated interest in the past in the question of Italian and Greek relationship to BGFIEND, as well as to resolution with OSO of the mechanics involved in such an approach if it is deemed desirable. In this connection, while I can see no particular objections to informing the Greeks and Italians as specified, and in fact certain definite advantages, principally in laying the groundwork for future requests for assistance, I strongly believe that such an approach should

a. not be through intelligence channels (as suggested by the British), which in our own case means OSO;

b. not^{be} executed by the British alone, and

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c. be subject to prior approach to the French on the broadcast ship phase if such approach is approved.

5. In view of the foregoing, the following is recommended:

a. ADPC's approval be obtained on the recommendations contained in reference b. and that we then raise this question with the British prior to giving our reply on the proposals contained in reference c.

b. We refer the proposals contained in reference c. to the Department of State for policy comment.

c. Assuming that the Department of State has no policy objections to the proposals contained in reference c. (See ATHE-1271 (IN-15369) and Athens Embassy Telegram 155), we subsequently undertake to resolve with OSO the problems involved in informing the Greek and Italian Services.

d. We then reply to the British proposal contained in reference c. in whatever manner may be indicated by the results of the discussions proposed in the preceding paragraph.

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